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Abstract: 
The intensity of corruption in China has been progressively high since the 1980s. This seriously 
undermines the overall effectiveness of Chinese anti-corruption institutions and policies. This 
article argues that the existing anti-corruption measures in China have not been working 
properly to eliminate or even contain the problem at an acceptable level. It seems that 
something has been holding it back somewhere. This article argues that China badly needs, 
inter alia, a sincere demonstration of ‘political will’ from the top coupled with the introduction 
of ‘rule of law’ in the country. Without these two important elements, it will probably be quite 
difficult for China to achieve an effective anti-corruption mechanism. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
China’s reform policies since 1978 have been marked by enormous successes in its economy. 
Ironically, along with successes, came the problem of corruption primarily incited by the 
‘transition to a market economy’ (Dong and Torgler, 2013: 152). Corruption in China ‘hinders 
economic development, generates poverty and instability, and leads to an unequal distribution 
of income across localities’ (Wu and Zhu, 2011: 444). The Global Attitudes Survey of Spring 
2014 conducted by reputed fact tank Pew Research Center reveals that 54 percent of the 
respondents in China identified corruption as the number 1 problem of the country (Pew 
Research Center, 2014: 3). Therefore, the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
has recognized the growing importance of abating widespread corruption in China and of 
accordingly taking various measures from time to time in order to tackle the problem (Gong, 
2014: 1). Nevertheless, the issue of how successful these measures have, so far, been remains a 
matter of controversy.  
This article will attempt to critically evaluate the effectiveness of Chinese anti-corruption 
institutions and policies by taking the competing viewpoints into consideration. At the very 
beginning, there will be a brief overview of how corruption has been defined by the various 
international organizations as well as how it has been viewed in China. Secondly, attempts will 
also be made in order to assess the intensity of corruption in the country. The major causes and 
the changing pattern of corruption in China will also briefly be depicted in this section. Thirdly, 
the concerns of the Chinese citizens and policy elites about corruption will be noted. Fourthly, 
the article will try to find out how China has been tackling the problem of corruption so far and 
in this connection, an historical overview of Chinese anti-corruption institutions and policies 
will be placed in order to lay the foundation for the main section of the article.  
The main part of the article will essentially involve critical analyses by juxtaposing arguments 
and counter arguments supported by evidence from various sources. At the end, a quick 
summary of the main arguments will be presented along with a few concluding remarks. 
2. DEFINITION OF CORRUPTION 
The World Bank’s definition of corruption is simple – “the abuse of public office for private 
gain” (International Monetary Fund, 1998: 8). United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) also reiterates almost the same definition in a slightly rephrased form – “the misuse 
of a public or private position for direct or indirect personal gain” (United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime, 2004: 23). This definition by the United Nations broadens the scope by 
adding ‘private position’ in it. International NGO Transparency International defines corruption 
as “… the abuse of entrusted power for private gain”(International Council on Human Rights 
Policy, 2009: 16). However, Chinese Criminal Law (CCL) distinguishes between corruption 
and malfeasance. Economic corruption like bribery, embezzlement, misappropriation, tax 
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evasion, copyright fraud etc. are seen as different from disciplinary crimes like negligence, 
dereliction of duty etc. (Wedeman, 2005: 100).                
3. INTENSITY OF CORRUPTION IN CHINA 
Quantifying the magnitude of corruption in a country is quite difficult due to the secretive 
nature of this behavioral phenomenon. The task is presumably much more difficult in a country 
like China where an current regime tightly controls all the state organs including the judiciary, 
the media, and other formal and informal institutions of society. Chinese official statistics 
regarding corruption are considered by scholars as understated. According to Melanie Manion, 
even these understated official statistics were good enough for her to conclude that ‘corruption 
exploded in the early 1980s and grew significantly in the 1980s through the 1990s’ (Manion, 
2004: 86). In fact, corruption in China has become more and more widespread since the launch 
of reforms in 1978 (Dong and Torgler, 2013: 152). It prevails almost everywhere – 
hierarchically from the top to the bottom, geographically across all provinces both urban and 
rural, sector wise from commercial to non-commercial type of charitable and social services, 
administratively from bureaucracy to party rank and file at different levels, and even in 
sensitive state organizations like the military and other security agencies. In summary, 
corruption has not only pervaded the economic spheres, but it has also affected politics, culture, 
and almost ‘all aspects of social life’ in China (Manion, 2004: 84). 
A relatively low level of corruption was observed in the country during the 1950s – 1970s. 
Since 1978, however, the transition from command economy to market economy created ample 
opportunities for party-state officials to exploit state resources for their private gains (Wallace, 
2014: 4). The launch of experimentations like dual-track pricing, decentralization, reforms in 
State Owned Enterprises (SOEs), and rapid urbanization enabled immoral opportunists to take 
undue advantage of their positions. The overall pattern of Chinese corruption has been 
changing in response to the changes in economic and administrative spheres. Amid the growth 
of a vibrant private sector, corruption in China has been expanding from ‘non-transactional’ 
type of corruption like embezzlement and misappropriation to ‘transactional’ type of corruption 
like bribery (Ko and Weng, 2012: 718-23). Conventional wisdom suggests that better pay for 
government officials might help reduce corruption. But in the case of China, higher 
remuneration for government officials has been playing ‘a limited role’ in controlling 
corruption (Liou, Xue, and Dong, 2012: 111; Gong and Wu, 2012: 192). Some argue in favor 
of implementing fiscal decentralization in order to reduce the level of corruption. But it has 
been reported by scholars that fiscal decentralization in China without monitoring exacerbated 
corruption (Ko and Zhi, 2013: 36).  
Corruption rose dramatically during the 1980s, while the 1990s witnessed an overall 
intensification of the same involving ‘larger sums of money’ and at the same time, ‘higher 
levels of officials’ (Wedeman, 2004: 895). Alarmingly, many of the cases involving big sums 
of money had been linked to a number of top leaders of the CCP. The case of Bo Xilai, a 
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politburo member of the CCP, drew much attention in 2012 (The Guardian, 2012). Last year, 
the case of Zhou Yongkang, a former politburo standing committee member of the CCP, again 
made headlines. Since 1949, he has been considered to be the most senior leader of the CCP to 
be implicated in a corruption case (New York Times, 2014). Another high profile case has been 
the one involving former Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission and PLA top 
General Xu Caihou. He died of cancer recently while under trial (New York Times, 2015).  
Other top leaders and officials sentenced or investigated for corruption include former Mayor 
of Beijing and Politburo member Chen Xitong (South China Morning Post, 1995), former 
Mayor of Shanghai and Politburo member Chen Lianyu (The Guardian, 2006), Railway 
Minister Liu Zhijun (South China Morning Post, 2013), former Mayor of Nanjing Ji Jianye 
(BBC News, 2013), former head of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (SASAC) Jiang Jiemin (China Economic Review, 2013), former Vice Minister of 
Public Security Li Dongsheng (Huffington Post, 2013), former Deputy Chief of National 
Development and Reform Council (NDRC) Liu Tienan (Financial Times, 2013), and so on. 
These are some of the high profile cases of corruption that drew world’s attention. According to 
media reports, a total of 51,306 officials and 37,551 cases were investigated in 2013 on 
corruption charges (China Daily, 2014). But a more recent report suggests that 55,101 officials 
and 41,487 cases were investigated in 2014 marking a 7.4% increase in the number of officials 
and a 10.48% increase in the number of cases over the preceding year (China Daily, 2015). In 
2014, China ranked 100th in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) by Transparency 
International (TI) among the 175 countries/territories that were studied (Corruption Perception 
Index - CPI, 2014: 5).  
4. IS CORRUPTION A SERIOUS CONCERN IN CHINA? 
Xi Jinping’s warning of 2012 highlighting the fact that corruption may cause “public anger, 
civil unrest and government collapse” was, in fact, an official recognition of the serious public 
concern regarding corruption. He had also pointed to the potential threat that corruption posed 
to the legitimacy of the current regime. Various public opinion polls and events since the 1980s 
have been suggesting corruption as one of the top concerns of the citizens of the country. 
History suggests that the much talked about 1989 event was centered around corruption as one 
of the key grievances of the public (Manion, 2004: 180). In 2002, an internet survey conducted 
by the CCP newspaper reported that corruption topped the table of ten social, political and 
economic concerns of the citizens (Straits Times, 2002). The latest Survey by Pew also 
suggested that 54% of the respondents in China identified corruption as their top concern (Pew 
Research Center, 2014: 3). Chinese people have been expressing their growing concerns 
regarding corruption in various ways like protests, polls, petitioning etc. over a period of more 
than 3 decades. Some of the occasional outbursts shook the regime to its base and drew the 
attention of the entire world. But most of these outbursts often go unreported and are 
suppressed by the Chinese government. A few of the cases are, of course, taken seriously by the 
authority prompting quick remedial actions. For instance, the Wukan protest drew much media 
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attention, and it could be cited as an example where the provincial government came forward to 
intervene in order to resolve the tense situation (New York Times, 2012). Therefore, they have 
been taking the growing public concerns about corruption into serious consideration.       
5. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CHINA’S ANTICORRUPTION 
MECHANISM 
After the CCP’s assumption of power in 1949, the first ever anticorruption campaign was 
launched in December 1951 - known in history as the ‘Three Anti campaign’. The second 
campaign was launched in January 1952 known as the ‘Five Anti campaign’ (Manion, 2004: 
156). History suggests that these campaigns mainly relied on party leadership and mass 
mobilization without having an appropriate legal framework at that time. Although, it was 
perhaps too early to have a proper legal framework in the country, nobody dared to question the 
legality of anticorruption campaigns amidst the high tide of the revolutionary spirit. These 
successive two campaigns can be viewed as more of a political consolidation exercise for the 
victorious communists. These campaigns served at least two purposes - a) boosting the morale 
of the party cadres and the ordinary citizens in favor of the revolution, and b) panicking the 
bourgeois elements in the society.  
Post-Mao era anticorruption campaigns, however, have been different from the Mao era ones. 
Since 1978, the campaign designs have excluded the element of ‘mass mobilization’ (Manion, 
2004: 161). The reformers knew that mass mobilization may disrupt the normal functioning of 
the market mechanism and adversely affect their reform agenda. Therefore, they were adhering 
to the principle of maintaining order and discipline. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were five 
major anticorruption campaigns – 1982, 1986, 1989, 1993 and 1995. Campaigns described 
above have been characterized by their heightened publicity and increased intensity of 
enforcement, and therefore, overshadowed the routine enforcements.  
In China, the overall anticorruption enforcement mechanism comprises of various laws, 
regulations and policies along with a set of institutions which have been evolving over time. 
During the early years of the Mao era, there had almost been no legal framework to fight 
corruption. The Chinese Criminal Law (CCL) of 1979 had failed to specify certain aspects of 
corruption and the related punishments (Ko and Weng, 2012: 722). In 1988, the National 
People’s Congress (NPC) had enacted the Supplementary Regulation on Suppression of 
Corruption and Bribery clarifying on the ambiguities. Certain functions of the Central 
Discipline and Inspection Commission (CDIC) of the CCP and the Ministry of Supervision had 
been merged in 1993-1994 in order to avoid overlapping and duplication of dealings with the 
cases that involved party cadres. In 1997, NPC had passed five anticorruption laws and 
disciplinary regulations to fill the legal vacuum (Yang, 2009: S147).   
Currently, the two key institutions focusing on anticorruption enforcement in China are a) the 
Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP), and b) the Central Discipline and Inspection 
Commission (CDIC). The SPP represents the state, reports to the State Council, and has been 
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responsible for the investigation and prosecution of all corruption cases in China. The CDIC 
represents the party, reports to the party high-ups, and has been responsible for the primary 
investigation of corruption cases involving CCP cadres. The legal framework of China’s 
anticorruption mechanism also involves the supportive roles of the legislature (NPC) to enact 
the required laws, the law enforcing agencies to help and support enforcements, and the 
People’s Court to finally try the cases of corruption. In case of China, one must not forget the 
most important role of the party at the center which is to issue various narratives setting the 
ultimate policy directions and the associated courses of action.      
6. EFFECTIVENESS OF THE ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS AND 
POLICIES IN CHINA 
For the convenience of analysis, this section will be divided into two parts – a) the effectiveness 
of anti-corruption measures during the Mao era, and b) the effectiveness of anti-corruption 
measures during the post-Mao era. 
6.1 Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Measures during Mao Era 
Mao era anti-corruption measures have been known in history for two popular campaigns – a) 
the ‘three anti campaign’, and b) the ‘five anti campaign’. Both the campaigns had been driven 
by mass mobilization creating widespread panic in the minds of state officials about the dire 
consequences of corruption which had an overall deterring effect (Manion, 2004: 159). In terms 
of numbers, the ‘three anti campaign’ was a big success. It had exposed 1.23 million corrupt 
officials which was equivalent to one third of the officials covered by the campaign. More than 
100,000 officials had been identified as tigers involved in cases worth 1,000 Yuan or more, 
around 4% of them had been given criminal punishment, 21% had to accept disciplinary actions, 
and about 76% had been exempted. The ideological spirit of the people and party cadres were 
at a peak at the time and the campaigns were on time to boost their spirits further. The 
campaigns were viewed positively as the reflection of the CCP’s commitment to high moral 
standards and an intolerant attitude towards corruption. This ultimately contributed to the 
strengthening of the legitimacy of the CCP. The campaigns also acted as ‘a huge exercise in 
mass political education’ trying to establish the ideological superiority of CCP ideals over those 
of the bourgeois. Moreover, the campaigns successfully eliminated the bourgeois elements, the 
political enemies of the CCP, in the government offices to create replacement opportunities for 
party cadres. The party organization was strengthened by activating the existing members of 
the party as well as recruiting new cadres from the enthusiasts identified during the campaigns. 
In summary, the Mao era anticorruption campaigns were effective in achieving multifaceted 
results for the newly installed regime of the CCP.   
6.2 Effectiveness of Anti-corruption Measures During Post-Mao Era 
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Scholars are divided on the issue of overall effectiveness of the post-Mao era Chinese anti-
corruption measures. Due to space constraints, two contrasting viewpoints from – a) Ko and 
Weng (2012), and b) Manion (2004) and Wedeman (2005) - will be discussed in this section.  
According to Ko and Weng, China has been experiencing an overall downward trend in 
corruption since 1998 mainly due to the increased efficacy of anti-corruption measures and 
other administrative reforms (Ko and Weng 2012: 729). They argue that corruption in China 
has several aspects including embezzlement, misappropriation, bribery, profiteering etc. They 
oppose the tendency of portraying an overall worsening milieu of Chinese corruption. In their 
opinion, the situation of corruption has, particularly after the 1990s, improved in some aspects 
while worsening in others. For example, despite an increase in the ‘transactional’ type of 
corruption like bribery, there has been a downward trend in ‘non-transactional’ types of 
corruption like embezzlement and misappropriation (p. 719).      
Contrarily, according to others, corruption in China has been continuously growing despite 
‘repeated crackdowns’ that leads to the conclusion that the Chinese anti-corruption mechanism 
has not been working effectively (Manion, 2004: 84; Wedeman, 2005: 93). Melanie Manion in 
her book presented corruption related data for the period of 1979-2000 to support her 
hypothesis of the explosion of corruption in China, and mainly on that basis, she reached to an 
overall conclusion that the anti-corruption measures in China had not been working properly. 
However, her data also showed a downward trend since 1998 as was mentioned by Ko and 
Weng (2012). She further argued that the campaigns were disrupting the routine enforcement 
mechanism further barring the institutionalization of ‘rule of law’ (Manion, 2004: 198).      
This article takes account of important arguments from both viewpoints. In fact, both have 
certain valid points to look at. Data presented by Melanie Manion (from 1979 to 2000) and Ko 
and Weng (from 1998 to 2007) have been from the same source and are therefore consistent 
with each other. Differences have mainly been reflected in their approaches as well as in their 
conclusions. However, this article highlights the limitation of Chinese official data related to 
corruption due to various structural and societal reasons. The article also recognizes the fact 
that corruption in China has still been exacerbating which has been reflected in all the available 
indicators such as the CPI of TI, various opinion polls and surveys conducted by national and 
international research centers, stakeholders’ perspectives computed by the World Bank and 
Heritage Foundation etc. Estimates have suggested that corruption every year eats up state 
revenue to the tune of approximately 4% of Chinese GDP (Manion, 2004: 86). Facts and 
figures from various sources underpin the argument that the anti-corruption measures in China 
have not been delivering the desired results at least in terms of containing the problem and thus 
hurting the country in a big way. In this connection, certain weaknesses that have so far been 
adversely affecting the overall effectiveness of the Chinese anti-corruption mechanism are 
discussed below.   
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The most important weakness of the Chinese anti-corruption mechanism has been the 
ineffectiveness of the routine anti-corruption enforcement mechanism. Therefore, several 
campaigns have been launched at regular intervals. This tendency of launching campaigns one 
after another has been undermining the credibility and effectiveness of routine enforcement 
(Manion, 2004: 198). Campaigns also undermine the issue of ‘rule of law’. Perhaps the absence 
of ‘rule of law’ has made the situation particularly worse for China. Discriminatory treatment 
of corruption cases undermines the credibility of the existing anti-corruption mechanism.  
This sometimes allows corrupt officials to escape by exerting undue political influence. CDIC 
or DICs may ignore, condone, or just put away corruption cases without being challenged by 
state agencies. Such absolute discretion coupled with undue political influence over the state 
hampers the effectiveness of Chinese anti-corruption measures in a big way.  
Another important weakness of the Chinese anti-corruption mechanism has been the absence of 
free media and a proactive civil society. In liberal democracies, the media and civil society play 
an important role as the whistleblowers exposing various corrupt practices. The CCP has never 
allowed due space for ‘the independent public, media and civil society as monitors of corrupt 
officials’ (Birney, 2014: 65).  
Existing mechanisms of reporting corruption incidents by Chinese citizens have remained 
flawed and inadequate. As a result, many of the corruption incidents go unreported in China 
(Manion, 2004: 87). Nevertheless, over 90% of corruption cases since 1980 have originated 
from the reporting of citizens (Ko and Weng, 2012: 726). Under an authoritarian rule, it is quite 
challenging for an ordinary citizen to come forward and report an incident of corruption. The 
risk of retribution by the powerful nexus may pose serious threats to a complainant when such 
retributions are not subject to severe punishment (Manion, 2004: 167). Moreover, the reward 
for reporting an incident of corruption has been negligible considering the potential risk of 
retribution. Therefore, very few citizens dare to report incidents of corruption that they 
encounter.   
The predecessors of Xi Jinping such as Deng Xiao Ping, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had also 
expressed similar sentiments against corruption that we have been hearing from the incumbent 
leader nowadays (Manion, 2004: 180 & 194). Their words never really transformed into real 
action in the past. Since 1978, Chinese anti-corruption measures have not been pervasive 
enough with an uncompromising attitude of zero tolerance to corruption. Therefore, citizens 
have always been skeptical and considered these to be political rhetoric only (p. 198). High-
profile anticorruption cases have often been characterized as results of factional political 
grouping inside the CCP (Shambaugh, 2015).  
7. CONCLUSION 
From the above analyses, it has been evident that the intensity of corruption in China has been 
progressively high since the 1980s. This, however, seriously undermines the overall 
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effectiveness of Chinese anti-corruption institutions and policies. The article argues that the 
existing anti-corruption measures in China have not been working properly to eliminate or even 
contain the problem at an acceptable level. In this connection, one may aptly ask the question 
whether it will be possible to bring down the level of corruption in China to an absolute zero. 
Various corruption indices suggest that there exists no such country in the world with a zero 
level of corruption (Ramirez, 2014: 77). However, this article further argues that it is perhaps 
quite possible to bring down the level of corruption in China to a tolerable level at least 
compared to that of Singapore (7th position in the CPI of TI) and Taiwan (35th position in the 
CPI of TI), its close neighbors in the East and Southeast Asian region (Corruption Perception 
Index - CPI, 2014: 4). China may learn from the experience of its neighbors.   
Some scholars tend to argue that all the efforts for an effective anti-corruption mechanism in 
China will be fruitless without the much talked about political reform leading to a Western-
style democracy (Shambaugh, 2015). But similar authoritarian regimes in Singapore and 
Taiwan with the same race of people and the same Confucian culture have been doing far better 
than China in terms of containing corruption due to a better situation with regards to ‘rule of 
law’. If ‘rule of law’ is ensured in China, routine enforcements may suffice to curb corruption 
and contain it at a tolerable level, and perhaps there will be no need for sporadic anti-corruption 
campaigns in the future. 
This article also highlights the importance of having a strong ‘political will’ in order to combat 
corruption in China. Since the late 1990s, China has substantially improved its anti-corruption 
mechanism by enacting numerous anticorruption regulations and laws, developing specialized 
anti-corruption institutions, implementing administrative reforms, and improving accounting 
and auditing standards (Ko and Weng, 2012: 719). Nonetheless, the overall outcome suggests 
that the mechanism has not yet been working properly (Manion, 2004: 197) and it seems that 
something has been holding it back somewhere.  
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